Dragons and tigers are standing in a row, and the southeast is beautiful - Southeast (Part 2)

1) The geographical background of the Northern Expedition

The Northern Expedition launched from the southeast has few truly succeeded, not only politically, but also related to the Northern Expedition strategy. The north-south struggle to the Central Plains from the southeast to advance to the north and the north-south geographical situation is the basic prerequisite for formulating the Northern Expedition strategy.

As mentioned earlier, the establishment of a country in the southeast mainly relies on the Yangtze River and the Huai River. Their attack, defense, advancement and retreat are based on them. This is the front of the Jianghuai defense system. However, whether it is advancing or retreating, it is necessary to manage the two wings in the southeast. Shandong and Jingxiang are the two wings in the southeast. If you manage these two places well, advance can overcome the Central Plains, and retreat can ensure the stability of the Jianghuai defense system. Shandong can protect the upper reaches of Huai and Si, and the Jingxiang area can protect the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. As an enterprising trend, the two wings must be managed well. The main reason is that the front of the Huai River is too far away, and its offense and defense often lose support. The mountains and rivers in Shandong and Jingxiang are enough to serve as barriers and as support for progress.

There were few successful Northern Expeditions in the south. In addition to being restrained by internal political factors, the improper strategy of the Northern Expedition was also an important reason for the failure of Northern Expeditions. For example, when Zuti made a Northern Expedition, he fought in Henan, and Henan was the intersection of chaos and turmoil. Chu Qi made a northern expedition, and the army left Sikou and went to Pengcheng, but he was defeated in Daibei. Yin Hao made a northern expedition, intending to go to Xu and Luo in the north, but first there was a plan to rebel from Xuchang, which led to a plan to send troops from Shouchun.

After being frustrated, Yao Xiang turned against each other in the direction of Xia Pi. Xie Wan made a northern expedition, from Wo River and Ying River to Luoyang, but withdrew in a hurry due to the strong Yan army, which caused the soldiers to be defeated. Xuchang, Yingchuan, Qiao, and Pei Zhucheng were each other. Xie Xuan made the northern expedition, and then attacked Pengcheng from Xia Pi, sent troops to cross the river to defend Liyang, and sent Liu Laozhi to support Yecheng. He submitted a memorial request to station himself in Pengcheng so as to "in Beigu River, in the west, and in the inner court."

[Note: Volume 79 of "Book of Jin"] The suggestion of Xie Xuan's Biography was also unwilling to the court. The Northern Expedition of Liu Song and Yuan Jia was only aimed at recovering Henan, but the result was always a complete loss. Xiao Yan's Northern Expedition in the Liang Dynasty and fought in Huainan was not so much ambition, but rather self-protection. Wu Mingche of the Chen Dynasty made a Northern Expedition to take advantage of the civil strife in the north and took advantage of the times, but also ended in the north and south of the Huai River. Zhang Jun of the Southern Song Dynasty made a northern Expedition to protect Lin'an, and his deployment was focused on the front of the Huai River. Yue Fei, who served as the main attack on both wings, and Han Shizhong, the two generals, were single and weak. Duanping the Northern Expedition and recovering the two capitals in a short period of time, only repeated the mistakes of Liu Song's recovery of the four towns in Henan.

In addition to mistakes such as war guidance, the improper strategy of the above-mentioned Northern Expedition is a very important reason for the lack of overall management of the geographical situation faced by the southeast. The above-mentioned Northern Expedition basically all came from the front of the Huai River, fighting for the four battles in Henan, and lacked support for the offensive and defensive situation. Among them, the battle of the Liu Song and Yuan Jia Northern Expedition to recover Henan and the Southern Song Duanping Northern Expedition to recover the Three Capitals. These two Northern Expeditions best reflect the geographical weaknesses and improper management of the Southeast regime during the Northern Expedition to the Central Plains.

In order to recover Henan, Emperor Wen of Song Liu Yilong launched two major northern expeditions in the seventh year of Yuanjia (430) and the twenty-seventh year of Yuanjia (450). Each Northern expedition was the Song army in the rainy season in spring and summer, and quickly fought to the front line of the Yellow River, and then lined up along the Yellow River for thousands of miles to guard. After occupying Henan in the seventh year of Yuanjia, four towns in Henan were established: Luoyang, Hulao, Huatai, and Wushu, with the intention of defending the river. However, when the autumn was high and the horses were fat, the Northern Wei cavalry went south, and the Liu family's defense in Henan quickly collapsed, so both Northern Expeditions ended in failure. The main reason for the failure of the Northern Expedition was that Liu Yilong's war guidance was incorrect. Here, it is worth analyzing the issue of Liu Yilong's selection of the target of the Northern Expedition. (See Figure 2-3-2)

Liu Yilong's Northern Expedition was only to recover Henan, but even if he could attack Henan, he might not be able to defend it even if he could attack it. After the Song army captured Henan, he lined up the Yellow River thousands of miles to guard it, and his troops were weak. Although the Yellow River was dangerous, it was not impossible to cross, especially in the cold winter, the river was frozen and the river could be crossed without a ship. Moreover, as early as the seventh year of Yuanjia, the Northern Wei had already driven Helianxia out of Guanzhong. In this way, the Northern Wei took Shanxi as the foundation, surrounded Hebei on the left and Guanzhong on the right, and looked at the Central Plains. That year, when Yanzhi advanced, the Northern Wei was planning to attack Rouran. The ministers were concerned about Liu Song, and Cui Hao asserted: "If the country was sent to Henan, it would not be able to defend it." [Note: Volume 35 of "Book of Wei" Biography of Cui Hao]

What he relies on is the geographical advantage of the Northern Wei Dynasty over the Central Plains. The problem facing Liu Yilong should actually be how to curb the aggressive southern advance of the Northern Wei Dynasty, rather than Henan's offensive and defensive. Therefore, Liu Yilong's northern expedition only aims at Henan every time, which is not a long-term plan.

However, the plan for advancing troops as Liu Xingzu, the governor of Qingzhou of Liu Song, was relatively favorable. In the 29th year of Yuanjia (452), Liu Yilong took advantage of the death of Emperor Taiwu of the Northern Wei Dynasty and planned to attack the northern expedition. Liu Xingzu said, "I am foolish that it is suitable to drive to Zhongshan (now Dingzhou) and follow the key points of its pass. To the north of Jizhou, the people entered Shangfeng, and the wheat was already ripe; because the capital was easy; the people who were Xiangyi must go to it. If Zhongzhou shakes, the south of the Yellow River will be destroyed. I ask for 7,000 troops in Qingji, and send generals to lead them to their confidants. If the front-end victory, Zhang Yong and the army in Henan should cross the river for a while, and make a sound and a real master, and also build a minister and a first affiliation. The west resists Taihang and the northern pass military capital (now Yongguan), and commands according to the affairs, and follow them to give additional instructions, fearing the mighty and favored, and the people are full of their feelings. If they can succeed, they can be clear and ready. If they do not win, they will not be seriously injured." [

Note: Volume 126 of Zizhi Tongjian, Song Ji Eight] Liu Xingzu learned from the lessons of the previous two struggles for Henan but failed, and suggested to advance to Hebei from Shandong to block the passes of Taihang Mountain, and to contain the Northern Wei in Shanxi. If Hebei was settled, Henan would naturally fall into the hands of the Song army. This is indeed a prospect that the Northern Wei was worried about. During the Northern Wei Dynasty's Northern Wei Dynasty's Northern Wei Dynasty's Northern Wei Cui Hao once analyzed to Emperor Taiwu: "I first said that the Yilong army came, and should be stationed in the river. Two roads went north, the east road to Jizhou (now Ji County, Hebei), and the west road to Ye, so your majesty should attack him and not be able to walk slowly; now, (Song Army) has two thousand miles of troops, with only a few thousand miles in one place, and the shape is weak. From this perspective, I just want to consolidate the river and defend myself, and there is no intention to cross the north." [Note: Volume 35 of "Book of Wei" Cui Hao]

In Cui Hao's view, if the Song army attacked Hebei after arriving at the Yellow River, the situation in the Northern Wei Dynasty would be very dangerous. Emperor Taiwu had to lead the army to fight, and it was urgent to wait. This shows that Liu Xingzu's strategy of advancing was extremely courageous and had an insight into the strategic situation of the confrontation between the Song and Wei. However, this strategy could not be implemented without the master of talented and powerful strategies. Liu Yilong's ambition and hope were not as good as this, so it was not adopted.

The Liu family's Northern Expedition ended in failure, which also led to a large-scale counterattack from the Northern Wei, especially the Northern Expedition in the 27th year of Yuanjia. After the Northern Wei counterattacked Henan, it advanced southward, with troops approaching Guazhou and drinking horses from the Yangtze River. The national strength of the Liu Song Dynasty was greatly damaged.

The Southern Song Dynasty's Northern Expedition to Recover the Three Capitals almost repeated the battle of Liu Song and Yuan Jia's Northern Expedition to Recover Henan. In order to destroy the Jin Dynasty, Mongolia sent envoys to join forces with the Song Dynasty to attack Jin. The Song and Mongolian coalition forces destroyed the Jin Dynasty in the first month of the first year of Duanping (1234). According to the agreement, the southeastern land of Chen, Cai in Henan belonged to the Southern Song Dynasty, and Chen, Cai in the northwest land belonged to Mongolia. Starting from coming south, it was still cautious about joining the Mongolian attack Jin. After destroying the Jin Dynasty, the Song army immediately retreated and increased the Jianghan area to prevent the southern Mongolian region.

Invasion. But the changes in the situation later changed the original intention of the monarchs and ministers of the Southern Song Dynasty. After the Mongolian destroyed the Jin Dynasty, a Han people were appointed as the general manager of Henan Province and commanded Henan. The Mongolian army left empty Henan before the arrival of midsummer that year, and went to the warm and cool places in the north to escape the summer. The vast Central Plains almost became a military vacuum. This situation made the monarchs and ministers of the Southern Song Dynasty suddenly become lucky. The Huaidong Pacifier Zhao Fan and others suggested "take the time to pacify the Central Plains, guard the river and seize the pass, and recover the three capitals (Kaifeng, Luoyang, Shangqiu)"

[Note: "The End of the History of Song Dynasty" Volume 92: The Restoration of the Three Capitals] Song Lizong and the Right Chenggong and the Privy Councilor Zheng Qing, the capital of Zheng Qing, praised this proposal. The Song army then advanced to Henan in June of the first year of Duanping (1234) when the war was not prepared enough. They occupied Bianjing and Luoyang. When the Khan of the Mongolian Ogedei heard the news, they ordered the general Tasi to lead the army south. The Mongolian cavalry went south, and the Song army was defeated at the touch, and could not defend Henan at all, so they retreated quickly. As bad as the Northern Expedition of Yuanjia, the Southern Song Dynasty's military operations triggered a large-scale invasion of the Mongolian army. In June of the following year, the Mongolian army advanced south in three directions. The two rivers of the Southern Song Dynasty, the Jianghuai and Jingxiang were all destroyed. Fortunately, it was thanks to the hard work of famous generals such as Meng Gong and Yu Jie that the Southern Song Dynasty was able to continue to remain peaceful in the southeast.

The Northern Expedition, which had a certain impact, started with the management of the two wings. For example, the Northern Expedition of Hengwen was all affected by Jing and Xiang. Huan Wen sent troops from Jiangling first, passed through Xiangyang, entered Wuguan, and arrived at Bashang, which shocked the Sanfu; later, he advanced north from Jiangling, exited Yishui, defeated Yao Xiang, forced his descendants to Zhou Cheng, and recovered the old capital Luoyang. Yue Fei also sent troops from Jingxiang. Yue Fei advanced north from Xiangyang, successively recovered Yingchang, Zhengzhou, Luoyang and other places, and took advantage of the victory to Zhuxian Town near Bianjing, preparing to cross the river and recover Hebei.

The most typical example of the Northern Expedition launched from the southeast can reflect the overall management of the geographical situation in the southeast in terms of its situation is the battle of Liu Yu's Northern Expedition of Later Qin. In the fifth year of Yixi of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (409), Liu Yu's northern expedition to Nanyan, brought Shandong back to the territory of the Eastern Jin Dynasty, ensuring the safety of the Huai-Si River Channel; in the eighth year of Yixi (412), Zhu Lingshi was sent to lead troops into Shu, pacify Jiao Zong, and return Sichuan to the territory of the Eastern Jin Dynasty, ensuring the safety of the upstream of Jingxiang, and operating Jingxiang as a forward base for the future Northern Expedition. In China, he suppressed the Lu Xun Uprising and fired opposition forces such as Liu Yi, Zhuge Changmin, and Sima Xiuzhi. The political situation in the Eastern Jin Dynasty was stable and the power of affairs was unified.

In August of the 12th year of Yixi (416), Liu Yu took advantage of the favorable opportunity of internal strife after the death of Yao Xing, the king of the Later Qin Dynasty. His attack deployment was roughly divided into three directions: Huaihe River, Shandong and Jingxiang. On the front of the Huaihe River, Wang Zhene, Tan Daoji led his infantry troops to attack from Shoushan to Xu and Luo directions, Shen Linzi and Liu Zunkao led the navy to advance westward along the Bian River as a successor; the northward army of Jingxiang was divided into two routes: Zhu Chaoshi, Hu Fan led his army to attack Luoyang from the south, Shen Tianzi, and Fu Hongzhi led his army to attack Wuguan from the south, and carried out restraining operations; Shandong, Wang Zhongde supervised the vanguard troops from Pengcheng to go to Sishui and opened Juyezhai into the Yellow River; Liu Yu led his army to wait for the opening of the waterway, and then advanced westward along the Yellow River. (See Figure 2-3-3)

This battle was grand, and the combination of attacks from several directions was enough to spread the overall situation. Zhu Chaoshi and Hu Fan, who went north from Jingxiang, strongly cooperated with the attack on Luoyang; Shen Tianzi and Fu Hongzhi took the lead in attacking Guanzhong from Wuguan, restrained most of the Qin army, and strongly cooperated with the attack on Tongguan front. In the Shandong direction, Wang Zhongde opened Juyeze and opened the traffic route from Sishui to the Yellow River. It was the main road for the Jin army to pass through and also the food and grass equipment of the Jin army.

Transportation line; In addition, after Liu Yu's main force entered the river, in response to the severe situation of the Northern Wei stationing 100,000 troops on the north bank of the Yellow River, he immediately established Beiqingzhou in Shandong, using Xiangmi as the governor of Beiqingzhou, guarding the clean cloth (now east and northwest of Shandong, Shandong), covering the way from Si to the river, and monitoring the Wei army's actions to ensure the safety of the rear. Due to Liu Yu's proper handling, the battle to attack the Later Qin was successfully launched. This Northern Expedition recaptured the vast areas south of Guanzhong and the Yellow River in one fell swoop.

In the early Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang's Northern Expedition was the only thorough and successful Northern Expedition launched from the southeast, and also set a precedent for unifying the world based on the southeast.

The Yuan Dynasty ruled tyrannical and was already shaking under the impact of the peasant uprising at the end of the Yuan Dynasty. After Zhu Yuanzhang wiped out the heroes in the south and unified the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, he immediately raised his troops to attack the Yuan Dynasty in the north. (See Figure 2-3-4)

When discussing the strategy of the Northern Expedition, the generals advocated direct acquisition of Dadu (now Beijing). Zhu Yuanzhang said: "After a hundred years of the Yuan Dynasty's capital, the city guards must be solid. If the army is in deep, it cannot be broken immediately. If the army is suspended, it will not be able to be promoted and pay the money. If the reinforcements are gathered in four groups, they will not be able to fight and retreat without any capital. It is not my benefit. I want to take Shandong first and remove it from the shield; to lead Henan, cut off its wings; to pull Tongguan and guard it, and to seize its hush. The situation in the world, enter my control, and then advance to Yuandu, then the power will be isolated and the support will be eliminated. If you do not fight, you can defeat it. Once you overcome the capital, you will walk through the clouds, Jiuyuan, and Guanlong, you can sweep down." [Note: "The Records of Taizu of Ming Dynasty" Volume 21]

Before Zhu Yuanzhang's northern expedition, he pacified Chen Youliang in the west and controlled the upstream of Jingxiang; destroyed Zhang Shicheng in the east and consolidated the foundation of the Three Wus. He controlled Jingxiang and ensured the control of the Yangtze River situation; consolidated the Three Wus and ensured the stability of the rear. After experiencing the impact of the Liu Futong Uprising, the Yuan Dynasty was in poor military preparations. The generals it relied on were like Kuogutemur who occupied Shanxi, and Li Siji and Zhang Liangbi who were in charge of military power and profit, and each made a move to protect the territory and seize the separatist situation, attacked each other, and were not unified. This just gave Zhu Yuanzhang the opportunity to defeat and directly attack Dadu.

After the Yuan Dynasty lost control of the area south of the Jianghuai River, it was relying on Henan. Shandong was used as a southern barrier to resist the Ming army heading north. Shandong was the southern barrier of the capital, monitoring the major artery of north-south water transportation, and it was a hub position between the north and south, so it was best to take it first to "removal of its shield". The Yuan Dynasty lost Shandong and it was equivalent to opening the door and no natural barrier to defend the Ming army. After the Ming army captured Shandong, it could also use the northern section of the Grand Canal.

, and drive along the river. Taking Henan can protect the flanks of the Northern Expedition Army. As for the attack of Henan, the troops stopped Tongguan without attacking Guanzhong, and directly attacked Hebei without attacking Shanxi. On the one hand, as Zhu Yuanzhang analyzed: "Kukuo Timur, Li Siji, and Zhang Sidao were all fighting for hundreds of battles, but they were not willing to go straight. If they were in a hurry, they would work together in a corner, and it was not easy to settle. Therefore, they would be unintentional and turned against the north. After Yandu was pacified, they would then fight to the west. They would hope that they would lose their power and defeat them without fighting."

[Note: Volume 8 of the Chronicles of Ming History" Volume 8 of the Northern Expedition of the Central Plains] On the other hand, there are also geographical reasons. Zhu Yuanzhang's goal of the Northern Expedition was in Hebei, and there would be a long exposure of the flanks during the attack. Liu Yu risked the danger of being cut off by the Northern Wei when he attacked the Later Qin Dynasty. In the early Ming Dynasty, Kuo Temur (i.e., Wang Baobao) was the most common general in the Yuan Dynasty who was used to fighting, and his troops were also elites of the Yuan army. If he attacked Shanxi, it would have been prolonged. The Northern Song Dynasty first attacked the northern Han Dynasty and then seized Youyun. As a result, the Northern Han Dynasty repeatedly attacked the Northern Han Dynasty and exhausted the elite of the country and eventually was unable to recover the sixteen prefectures of Youyun. After taking Henan, Zhu Yuanzhang attacked Hebei directly, which was very similar to the strategy of the Northern Expedition mentioned by Liu Xingzu during the Liu Song Dynasty. Zhu Yuanzhang's idea of ​​the Northern Expedition was in line with the political situation at that time and the geographical situation of the north-south struggle.
Chapter completed!